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INDIANS, RACE, AND CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Alex Tallchief Skibine*  
Which Sovereign, among the Federal, States, and Indian 
nations, has criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country depends on 
whether the alleged perpetrator and/or the victim qualify as an 
“Indian” for the purposes of certain federal laws.1  Criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian Country is mostly determined by four federal 
laws, none of which have a specific definition of “Indian.”2  Not only 
is there no consensus among the Circuits concerning who qualifies 
as an “Indian,”3 but there has recently been a debate among jurists 
about  whether the classification of “Indian” for the purposes of 
these criminal laws amounts to a racial classification calling upon 
courts to review such classifications using strict scrutiny.4 
When it comes to criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, some 
judges as well as commentators have argued that unless the term 
“Indian” is restricted to people who are officially enrolled members 
of federally recognized Indian tribes or eligible for such 
membership, the classification amounts to a racial classification 
and strict scrutiny should be applicable.5  Yet, for years, federal 
 
* S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
 1 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (“Indian Country” today is a term of art that includes 
all lands within Indian reservations as well as land held in trust or restricted fee 
by the United States for the benefit of Indians, and lands set aside by the United 
States for Dependent Indian Communities). 
 2 Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey 
Through a Jurisdictional Maze. 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976) (On the intricacies of 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country).   
 3 See Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not to Be: Who is an “Indian 
Person”?, 73 MONT. L. REV. 61, 66 (2012) (hereinafter, Who is an Indian). 
 4 See United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stymiest, 
581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234 
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Las 
Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1231 (D.Nev. 2014).  
All recent cases debating the issue.   
 5 See Quintin Cushner & Jon M. Sands, Blood Should Not Tell: The Outdated 
“Blood” Test Used to Determine Indian Status in Federal Criminal Prosecution, 
THE FED. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 35 (discussing and agreeing with Judge Rymer’s 
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courts have not restricted the term “Indian” to enrolled members 
of Indian tribes but have also included persons of Indian ancestry 
with substantial ties to Indian communities.6  Many scholars and 
commentators have endorsed such a position.7  Although the 
United States has treated Indians as belonging to a distinct race  
that fact alone does not transform all legislation treating Indians 
differently into racial classifications.8  The origin of the debate can 
be traced to Morton v. Mancari where the Court ruled that a 
federal law giving preference in employment to “Indians” within 
the Department of Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs did not 
amount to a racial classification because it did not give preferences 
to all “Indians” as a race but only to members of Indian tribes with 
whom the federal government has a government to government 
relationship.9  As such, the classification was political and not 
racial.  The proper standard of judicial review, therefore, was 
rational basis review and not strict scrutiny.  As further elaborated 
in this Article, the Mancari decision was not pellucid in explaining 
the extent and ramifications of its holding.10  Furthermore, its 
rationale seemed to contain some contradictions which have fueled 
the debate ever since.11 
The main question addressed in this Article is whether, because 
of either constitutional or policy reasons, the definition of Indians 
for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country should 
now be construed to only include “enrolled” members of Indian 
tribes.  In order to discuss this issue, Part I of this paper gives a 
brief summary of the laws governing criminal jurisdiction in 
 
dissent in Bruce v. United States, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 6 See Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the 
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 276–
77 (2001).   
 7 See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as 
Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 995–96 (2011); Brian L. Lewis, Do you 
Know What you Are? You are What you is; You is What you am: Indian Status for 
the Purpose pf Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and the Current Split in the Courts 
of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHIC JUST. 241, 244 (2010); Weston Meyring, 
“I’m an Indian Outlaw, Half Cherokee and Half Choctaw”: Criminal Jurisdiction 
and the Question of Indian Status, 67 MONT. L. REV. 177, 230 (2006). 
 8 See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal 
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1046–47, 1127 (2012); Bethany R. Berger, 
Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1170 
(2010). 
 9 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974). 
 10 See infra notes 92–114.   
 11 See Carole Goldberg, What’s Race Got to Do with It? The story of Morton v. 
Mancari, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 389 (Kevin K. Washburn et al. eds., 2011).   
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Indian Country and explains how the courts have interpreted the 
term “Indian” for the purposes of these laws.  Part II discusses how 
the Supreme Court determines whether a classification of “Indian” 
amounts to a racial classification, and suggests what test should 
be applied to make such determinations.  After applying that test 
to the definition of “Indian” in federal criminal laws regulating 
jurisdiction in Indian Country, Part III discusses what definition 
of “Indian” makes the most sense from a policy perspective, taking 
into account the current federal policies towards Indian tribes, as 
well as the realities of law enforcement in Indian Country. 
 
I. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 
A. The Statutory Scheme 
 
Although federal criminal laws of general applicability are 
generally applicable in Indian Country,12 a few federal criminal 
laws are specifically applicable only in Indian Country.  The five 
major laws are the Indian Country Crimes Act (also known as the 
General Crimes Act),13 The (Indian) Major Crimes Act,14 Public 
Law 280,15  the statute generally known as the Duro Fix,16 and the 
2013 Amendments to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).17 
The Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA) has its origins in the 
early Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts of the 1790’s and was 
amended into its final and current form in 1854.18  It extended the 
general criminal laws of the United States over any offense 
committed in Indian Country, but contains three exceptions: (1) 
crimes committed by Indians against other Indians; (2) crimes 
committed by Indians against anyone if such Indian perpetrator 
has already been punished under the laws of the tribe; and (3) any 
case where by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over 
such offenses has been reserved to the Indian tribe.  ICCA is 
 
 12 See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 896–97 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 13 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 14 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). 
 15 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012); 83 Pub. L. No. 280 (1953). 
 16 Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) 
(2012)). 
 17 Pub. L. No. 113-4., 127 Stat. 54 (codified in relevant part at 25 U.S.C. 1304, 
and 18 U.S.C. 117(a).   
 18 Regulation of Trade and Intercourse with Indian Tribes, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).  
On the evolution of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country see, Robert N. Clinton, 
Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical 
Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 955 (1975). 
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generally understood as only affecting “interracial” crimes.19 
The Major Crimes Act (MCA) was enacted in 1885 as a reaction 
to a Supreme Court decision which held that the federal 
government did not have jurisdiction under the Indian Country 
Crimes Act to prosecute one Indian for the murder of another 
Indian when the crime took place in Indian Country.20  The Indian 
Major Crimes Act extended federal criminal jurisdiction over any 
Indian who committed any of (originally) seven major crimes 
against any other person, Indian or non-Indian.21 
Public law 280 was enacted in 1953.22  In provisions relevant to 
the subject at hand, the law transferred to designated states the 
criminal jurisdiction previously exercised by the federal 
government pursuant to the Indian Country Crimes Act and the 
Indian Major Crimes Act.23  P.L. 280 did not provide a separate 
definition for “Indian.” 
In 1991, Congress enacted what is popularly known as the “Duro 
Fix” as a response to the Court’s 1990 decision in Duro v. Reina 
which held that Indian tribes, by virtue of their status as domestic 
dependent nations within the United States, had been implicitly 
divested of criminal jurisdiction over Indians who were not 
members of the prosecuting tribes.24  The “Duro Fix” reaffirmed 
and restored the “inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”25  More important for the 
purpose of this Article, the “Duro Fix” defined “Indian” to mean 
“any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States as an Indian under [the Indian Major Crimes Act] if that 
person were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian 
country.”26  The legislative choice made in 1991 to incorporate by 
reference the meaning of “Indian” from a previous law which itself 
 
 19 Indian Country Crimes Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012)). 
 20 See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557, 572 (1883).   
 21 See generally, Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law & Tribal Self-
Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 824 (2006).   
 22 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 67, Stat. 588, (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2012), 25 U.S.C. § 1321-26 (2012)).   
 23 83 PUB. L. NO. 280, supra note 15 (this regulation did not transfer to the 
states the criminal jurisdiction exercised by the federal government pursuant to 
criminal laws of general applicability).  It also did not confer any civil regulatory 
authority to the states.  See generally, DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, 
CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (2012). 
 24 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (The Court had previously ruled 
that Indian tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).  But see 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).   
 25 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2016).   
 26 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2016). 
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did not define the term was puzzling, to say the least, and invited 
litigation over that issue.  For instance in In Re: Duane Gervais, 27 
a federal district court held that the petitioner/defendant was not 
an Indian for the purpose of the Duro fix, and therefore, the tribe 
did not have criminal jurisdiction over him.  At least one scholar 
has advocated that the definition of “Indian” for the purposes of 
the Duro fix should be different than it is for the purposes of the 
ICCA and MCA.28 
Finally, in 2013, Congress amended the Violence Against 
Women Act to restore tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians who 
commit crimes of domestic violence against tribal Indians while in 
Indian Country.  Just as in the Duro fix, the Amendments did not 
provide a new definition of “Indian.”29 
Although there are no substantive differences concerning who 
qualifies as an Indian under ICCA or the IMCA, there are 
procedural differences.  In a typical ICCA prosecution, the 
defendant can either be an Indian accused of committing a crime 
against a non-Indian or a non-Indian accused of having committed 
a crime against an Indian.  Defendants in both situations have the 
initial duty to raise their status, or the one of their victims (as an 
Indian or a non-Indian), as an affirmative defense to the federal 
prosecution, and carry the initial burden of production for that 
issue by a preponderance of the evidence.  The burden then shifts 
to the government to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  In a prosecution under the Indian Major Crimes Act, the 
defendant’s Indian status is an essential element of the 
government’s case which the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.30 
 
B. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW ADDITIONS 
 
In addition to denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
 
 27 In re Garvais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (2004). 
 28 See Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and 
Blood, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 337 (2016) (recommending that tribal criminal 
jurisdiction should be determined by a Community Recognition Standard, 
meaning anyone who is recognized by the Tribe as a member of the community) 
(hereinafter Rolnick, Beyond Citizenship and Blood).   
 29 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 127 Stat. at 121-22 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. section 1304). 
 30 See United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015).   
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Indians31 and non-member Indians,32  the Supreme Court also 
made an important federal common law ruling concerning state 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians against other 
non-Indians. In United States v. McBratney33 the Court held that 
upon being granted statehood, the state of Colorado obtained 
criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens throughout the whole 
State.  Therefore, it had jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-
Indians against other non-Indians in Indian Country.  After first 
stating that the Act which granted statehood to Colorado 
necessarily repealed any existing treaty inconsistent with it,34 the 
Court reasoned that, “whenever, upon the admission of a State into 
the Union, Congress has intended to except out of it an Indian 
reservation, or the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over that 
reservation, it has done so by express words.”35  Furthermore, the 
Court used the equal footing doctrine, which guarantees admission 
of new states on an equal footing with the original states, to 
conclude that Colorado “has acquired criminal jurisdiction over its 
own citizens and other white persons throughout the whole of the 
territory within its limits.”36 
The Court never explained why Indian treaties were 
inconsistent with the Colorado Statehood Act.37  Furthermore, the 
cases cited as precedents for its statement that whenever it wanted 
to reserve exclusive jurisdiction over an Indian reservation, 
Congress in the past had used express words, do not stand for this 
principle.38  One can even question the continuing validity of the 
decision after later decisions specifically rejected reliance on the 
Equal Footing doctrine to abrogate tribal rights.39 
Although it is too late in the day for the Court to reverse this 
135 year old flawed reasoning, McBratney has a meaningful 
impact today if one decides to limit the definition of “Indian” to 
people who are enrolled tribal members or eligible for enrollment.  
That is because under that narrower definition of “Indian,” all 
 
 31 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). 
 32 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (legislatively overturned by the 
Duro Fix, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2016)).   
 33 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). 
 34 Id. at 623.   
 35 Id. at 623–24.   
 36 Id. at 624.   
 37 Id. at 623. 
 38 Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 756 (1866); United States v. Ward, 28 F. Cas. 
397, 398 (1863).   
 39 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1905); Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 206 (1999).   
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crimes committed by non-enrolled “Indians” against non-Indians 
or other non-enrolled Indians would transfer to state jurisdiction 
since they would become crimes by non-Indians against other non-
Indians. 
 
C. The Case Law Defining Who is an “Indian” Under the 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Statutes 
 
1. The Rogers Test 
 
The current test adopted by most courts today to determine who 
qualifies as an Indian for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country is frequently referred to as the Rogers test because 
it originated with the 1845 Supreme Court decision of United 
States v. Rogers.40  The case involved the federal prosecution of 
Rogers, a white man accused of having killed another person 
within Cherokee territory.  Rogers argued that he had become a 
citizen of the Cherokee Nation and, therefore, the federal 
government had no jurisdiction over him since the prosecution was 
brought under a statute which was a precursor to the ICCA and 
contained the same exemption for Indians committing crimes 
against other Indians.41  The Supreme Court disagreed, stating: 
 
We think it [is] very clear, that a white man who at 
mature age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not 
thereby become an Indian, and was not intended to 
be embraced in the exception . . . The exception is 
confined to those who by the usages and customs of 
the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race.  
[The exception] does not speak of members of a tribe, 
but of the race generally,-- of the family of Indians.42 
 
Although this language can arguably be read as reserving to the 
tribes the decision of who, under “the usage and customs of the 
Indians,” should be regarded as racially an Indian, this has not 
been the courts’ interpretation.43 
 
 40 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572–73 (1845). 
 41 Id. at 572 (interestingly, the victim was also a white man that had become 
a citizen of the Cherokee Nation).   
 42 Id. at 572–73. 
 43 But see Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship 
and Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337, 375 (2016) (arguing that tribes should 
56 ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10 
Although in the wake of Rogers, many courts struggled with 
determining whether half-blood Indians qualified as Indians.44  By 
1979, the Ninth Circuit had settled on a two prong test, stating 
“The test, first suggested in United States v. Rogers and generally 
followed by the courts, considers (1) the degree of Indian blood; and 
(2) Tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian.”45  In United 
States v. Bruce,46 the Ninth Circuit refined the second prong of the 
Rogers test.  Bruce involved an ICCA prosecution where the 
defendant was arguing that because she was an Indian who had 
committed a crime against another Indian, she should have been 
prosecuted under the MCA and not the ICCA. 
The Court endorsed a four factor test to determine if the person 
should be recognized as an Indian.  The four factors are: 1. Tribal 
enrollment; 2. Government recognition through receipt of 
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3. Enjoyment of the benefits of 
tribal affiliation; and 4. Social recognition as an Indian through 
residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social life.47 
The Ninth Circuit further clarified the meaning of the four Bruce 
factors in United States v. Cruz.48  Cruz was prosecuted as an 
Indian under the MCA but he challenged his status as an Indian.  
The majority held that the government had not met its burden to 
show that Cruz was an Indian because although Cruz had enough 
Indian blood to meet the first prong of the test, he did not meet any 
of the four factors in the second prong.  The Court first confirmed 
 
decide who is an Indian within their community, at least for the purpose of the 
Duro Fix).   
 44 See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896) (i.e. The Court held 
that the illegitimate child of a full blood Indian and a black man could not be 
classified as an Indian). 
 45 United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 46 United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 47 Id. at 1223.  The four factor test endorsed by Bruce had been essentially 
formulated in an earlier case by a federal district court in St. Cloud v. United 
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988).  After specifying that “The second prong 
of the Rogers test in essence probes whether the Native American has a sufficient 
non-racial link to a formerly sovereign people,” the St. Cloud court enumerated 
the four factors adopted later by the Bruce court.  St. Cloud v. United States, 702 
F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).  The St. Cloud court also added that “These 
factors do not establish a precise formula for determining who is an Indian.  
Rather, they merely guide the analysis of whether a person is recognized as an 
Indian.” Id.  Although the court found that even though St. Cloud did not meet 
the first two factors, he would normally be classified as an Indian because he met 
the last two factors, St. Cloud could not meet the test because he had been 
enrolled with a tribe which was officially terminated by the federal government.  
Id. at 1465.   
 48 United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2009).   
2017] INDIANS, RACE, AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 57 
that the Bruce factors were to be considered in descending order of 
importance.49  The fact that he was recognized as the descendant 
of a tribal member and was, as such, eligible for some federal and 
tribal benefits was not enough to make him an “Indian” because he 
never took advantage of any of those benefits.50  In addition, even 
though he had lived on the reservation when he was younger, had 
recently returned and had been prosecuted in tribal Court, he 
never considered himself an Indian or related to others socially as 
an Indian by participating in the tribe’s cultural life and 
ceremonies.51 
Chief Judge Kozinsky authored a dissent which strongly 
disagreed that the Bruce factors had to be considered in declining 
order of importance.52  He also took the position that whether one 
actually took advantage of federal and tribal benefits available to 
Indians was irrelevant.  What was important was that one was 
judged eligible for such benefits by federal or tribal authorities.53  
Finally, Judge Kozinski did not agree with the majority that 
whether one considers oneself an Indian is an important factor. 
More recently, the 9th Circuit added some modifications to the 
Bruce four factor test in the en banc decision in United States v. 
Zepeda.54  The Ninth Circuit first clarified that the accused must 
have a current relationship with a federally recognized tribe and 
that the tribe was federally recognized at the time of the offense.55  
Furthermore, as stated in a recent federal district court decision,  
 
Zepeda altered the language of the second factor of 
the Bruce test and clarified that the factor focuses 
on whether the individual received assistance 
reserved only for tribal members or those eligible to 
become members.  This alteration is not trivial as 
the original language from Bruce tested whether the 
individual received assistance ‘reserved only to 
Indians[.]’56 
 
As some commentators have noted, other Circuits have adopted 
 
 49 Id. at 846. 
 50 Id. at 849–50. 
 51 Id. at 848.   
 52 Id. at 852. 
 53 Id.   
 54 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 55 Id. at 1113–14.   
 56 United States v. Loera, 190 F. Supp. 3d 873, 882 (2016).   
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different tests to measure Rogers’ Second Prong.57  A good example 
of a slightly different approach is the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Stymiest.58  In that case, the government had 
indicted Stymiest under the Indian Major Crimes Act but Stymiest 
argued that he was not an Indian.  The Eighth Circuit first 
confirmed that although the Indian status of the defendant or the 
victim was essential to federal subject matter jurisdiction, it was 
not a jurisdictional issue to be decided by the court as a matter of 
law.  Instead, it was an element of the crime that must be 
submitted and decided by a jury.  The Eighth Circuit went on to 
adopt its own version for evaluating Rogers’ Second Prong, one 
where the Bruce factors are neither exhaustive, “[n]or should they 
be tied to an order of importance, unless the defendant is an 
enrolled tribal member, in which case that factor becomes 
dispositive.”59  In addition, the Stymiest Court held that two factors 
not listed by the Bruce court, whether the defendant identified 
himself as an Indian, and whether he subjected himself to the 
jurisdiction of the tribal court, were in fact relevant to the overall 
inquiry.60 
 
2. Issues with the Blood Quantum Prong 
 
Under the Rogers test, one cannot be an “Indian” without 
possessing some quantum of Indian blood although the courts have 
never formalized how much Indian blood was enough Indian 
blood.61  Although as late as 1968, some cases spoke of “substantial 
percentage of Indian blood,”62 and later cases seemed to have 
 
 57 See Katharine C. Oakley, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 177 (2010-2011) (describing all the 
various approaches which have been or might be taken by courts and arguing for 
a single uniform approach for the sake of consistency and clarity).  See also 
Donovan & Rhodes, Who is an Indian, supra note 3 (explaining the difference in 
approaches between the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).   
 58 United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009).   
 59 Id. at 764. 
 60 Id. at 763–64. (The Eight Circuit also made the interesting observation that 
it was troubled by the possibility that under the jury instruction given by the 
district judge, a jury could find someone to be an Indian without finding that such 
a person was “recognized as an Indian by the tribe or the federal government.”  
However, since no one had raised any objection, the court concluded that the jury 
instruction was not an abuse of discretion by the district court judge.).    
 61 See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding the 
defendant had 1/8th quantum of Indian blood and that was held to be enough to 
meet the first part of the test).   
 62 See Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 444 (1968) 
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lowered the necessary amount to 1/8th quantum of Indian blood 
and perhaps lower.63  A further complication concerns the kind of 
“Indian” blood that qualifies for the purposes of the test.  As stated 
in Bruce, “the first prong requires ancestry living in America before 
the Europeans arrived.”64  One could surmise that by “America” the 
Bruce court meant the United States of America, but the meaning 
is far from clear.  In one case, a state court found that a person of 
Canadian Indian heritage met the first prong of the Rogers test.65  
But if Canadian Indian blood qualifies, why not Indian blood from 
tribes aboriginal to Mexico? And if so, how about South and 
Central America?  It seems that for this purpose, the universe of 
Indian tribes from which Indian blood can be derived should be 
limited to tribes that are aboriginal to the United States.  But what 
about blood from tribes originating in the United States which no 
longer exist, have been terminated, or were never recognized by 
the federal government? 
This question provided a spirited debate in a recent Ninth 
Circuit en banc decision: United States v. Zepeda.66  At issue in that 
case was whether the government had met its burden under the 
Indian Major Crimes Act to show that the defendant, Zepeda, had 
“Indian blood.”  The more recent precedent before Zepeda was 
United States v. Maggi,67 where a panel of the Ninth Circuit held 
that the quantum of Indian blood must be traceable to a federally 
recognized Indian tribe.68  In its en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
overruled Maggi and concluded that the “blood” could come from 
any Indian tribe, recognized or not. 
The Court rejected the argument that allowing blood quantum 
from a non-federally recognized tribe would make federal 
jurisdiction depend upon a racial rather than a political 
classification.69  Even if it did, the court concluded that the second 
prong of the Bruce/Rogers test which requires some kind of 
 
(Describing the first prong as requiring “a substantial percentage of Indian 
blood.“).   
 63 See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1227.  See also Weston Meyring, “I’m an Indian 
Outlaw, Half Cherokee and Choctaw”: Criminal Jurisdiction and the Question of 
Indian Status, 67 MONT. L. REV. 177, 202 (2006) (while cases have not been 
entirely consistent, no cases has held that one could qualify as an Indian with less 
than 1/16th Indian blood quantum).   
 64 Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223.   
 65 State v. Daniels, 16 P.3d 650, 654 (2001).   
 66 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2015).   
 67 United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 68 Id. at 1080–81.   
 69 Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1111. 
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recognition as an Indian by, or affiliation with, a federally 
recognized Indian tribe, “is enough to ensure that Indian status is 
not a racial classification.”70  Furthermore, noting that the Court 
in Morton v. Mancari had upheld a law which specified that in 
order to take advantage of the law in question, “an Indian must be 
one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a 
Federally-recognized tribe,”71 the Zepeda court majority held that 
the blood quantum prong of the test did not transform the 
definition of “Indian” into a racial classification.72  Judges Kozinski 
and Ikuta issued vehement dissenting opinions.73 
Judge Kozinski took issue with the first prong of the Rogers test 
and even more with the majority’s holding that the Indian blood 
quantum needed to satisfy the first prong does not have to come 
from a federally recognized Indian tribe.74  According to him, 
overruling Maggi and allowing the necessary blood quantum to 
come from a non-federally recognized tribe made the Rogers test 
even worse because “Maggi at least tied the racial component in 
Bruce to a political relationship.”75  Answering the majority’s 
reliance on the second prong of the Rogers test to salvage its 
interpretation of the first prong, Judge Kozinski stated “[T]he 
presence of a separate and independent ‘non-racial prong’ cannot 
save a test that otherwise turns on race.”76 
For Judge Kozinski, it was problematic that some tribal 
members who satisfied the second prong of the Rogers test could 
still not be subject to the Major Crimes Act if those members failed 
the first prong in that they were not racially “Indian enough.”77  In 
other words, the law would allow Congress to “treat identically 
situated individuals within a tribe differently from one another 
based on their immutable racial characteristics.”78  Judge Ikuta 
joined Judge Kozinski in dissent and also added that the first 
prong of the Rogers test “disrespect tribal sovereignty by refusing 
to defer to the tribe’s own determination of its membership roll.  
 
 70 Id.   
 71 Id. at 1112 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553, n. 24 (1974)).     
 72 Id. at 1112 (quoting United v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)).   
 73 Id. at 1116–20, (Kozinski, J. & Ikuta, J., dissenting).   
 74 Id. at 1116. 
 75 Zepada, 792 F.3d at 1118.     
 76 Id. at 1117. 
 77 Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“But not all tribe members are subject to the 
IMCA. Separating those who are from those who are not is the function of Bruce’s 
first requirement, and that requirement turns entirely on race.”). 
 78 Id. at 1116. 
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It’s as if we declined to deem a person to be a citizen of France 
unless that person can prove up a certain quantum of “French 
blood.”79 
The dissent acknowledged that one Supreme Court precedent, 
United States v. Rogers, created the blood quantum part of the test 
but stated that “Reliance on pre-civil war precedent laden with 
dubious racial undertones seems an odd course for our circuit law 
to have followed.”80  Judge Kozinski also thought that Rogers could 
easily be distinguished as a case which just did not allow a white 
man to claim citizenship in an Indian tribe later in life in order to 
avoid federal prosecution for murder.81  Concerning the majority’s 
reliance that the law at issue in Mancari had a blood quantum, 
Judge Kozinski just mentioned that “that portion of the provision 
in Mancari wasn’t challenged by plaintiffs, nor was there any 
assertion that the hiring preference in that case discriminated 
among tribe members.82 
The majority argued that it was rational to allow the blood 
quantum to come from any Indian tribe, recognized or not, because 
otherwise it would be problematic for the federal government to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the required blood 
quantum comes from federally recognized tribes.83  I am not so sure 
that difficulty in proving something for the purpose of federal 
prosecution is enough of a reason to impose what seems to be an 
irrational and arbitrary requirement.  If genetic affiliation with a 
non-recognized tribe is sufficient, would one have to define the 
universe of “non-recognized” tribes?  Would genetic affiliation with 
a Canadian or Mexican Indian tribe qualify?  But if this is so, 
would it not indicate that the first prong of the Rogers test is really 
about making sure the person if of the Indian race?  Would this not 
then highlight that “racial” aspect of the classification? 
Scholars and commentators have also criticized continuing 
adherence to the Rogers decision,84 and continued adherence to it.85  
 
 79 Id. at 1119. 
 80 Id. at 1118. (J. Kozinski dissenting) (Referring to language in Rogers to the 
effect that the government had to exercise power over this “unfortunate race” in 
order “to enlighten their minds . . . and to save them if possible from the 
consequences of their own vices.”).   
 81 Zepada, 792 F.3d at 1118.   
 82 Id.   
 83 Id. at 1114–15.   
 84 Berger, supra note 8, at 2041. 
 85 See Cushner & Sands, supra note 5, at 35 (stating “We believe that the two 
pronged Rogers test . . . should be replaced by the simple requirement that a 
defendant be eligible for enrollment with the relevant federally recognized tribe.” 
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Although the Rogers decision may have adequately reflected the 
political leanings and feelings of the times during which it was 
decided, discarding the decision today would not have any major 
practical impacts.  To start with, discarding the first prong of the 
test would avoid the awkward possibility raised by Judge Kozinski 
that an enrolled member from a tribe with no minimum blood 
quantum requirement would be found not to have “enough” Indian 
blood to meet the first prong of the test.86  Secondly, because all 
Indian tribes do require their members to have some kind of Indian 
ancestry, the amount of people who can satisfy the second 
(recognition) prong of the test while having no Indian blood at all 
is likely to be infinitesimally small.87  Third, getting rid of the first 
prong would eliminate the thorny debate, as highlighted in 
Zepeda, about whether the Indian “blood” has to be traced to a 
federally recognized tribe. 
Finally, it should put to rest any discussion whether the 
classification is based on race.88 
 
3. Issues surrounding the Political Recognition Prong 
 
The second prong allows a person with enough Indian blood to 
qualify as an “Indian” as long as that person is recognized, 
politically or socially, as an Indian, by either the federal 
government, a federally recognized tribal government, or even a 
recognized Indian community.89  More importantly, the second 
prong allows someone to qualify as an Indian without being 
officially enrolled or eligible for enrollment in any federally 
recognized Indian tribe.  As stated by the Ninth Circuit: 
  
[A]lthough an allegation of enrollment may be 
sufficient for purposes of alleging federal 
 
(arguing that treating individual Indians as belonging to a (inferior) race rather 
than as citizens of Indian nations was crucial to aggrandizing the power of 
Congress over Indian affairs)). 
 86 See United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1282–83 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(membership in Tesuque Pueblo is not enough to satisfy Roger’s first prong absent 
evidence that Indian blood was one of the requirements for membership).   
 87 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).   
 88 But see Jacqueline F. Langland, Indian Status Under the Major Crimes Act, 
15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 109, 131 (2012) (arguing that relying on tribal 
membership in defining who is an Indian amounts to a racial classification since 
Tribes require Indian blood to be members).   
 89 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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jurisdiction, . . . enrollment has not yet been held to 
be an absolute requirement of federal jurisdiction . . . 
Nor should it be.  Enrollment is the common 
evidentiary means of establishing Indian status, but 
it is not the only means nor is it necessarily 
determinative.90 
 
The question here is whether there are any justifications today 
for not limiting the second prong to enrolled tribal members.  
Searching the older cases in the wake of Rogers, it seems that 
jurisdiction was extended to un-enrolled Indians because of 
essentially two factors.  First, it is not until the end of the 19th 
Century that the idea of having formal tribal membership rolls 
came into existence.91  The very idea of “enrollment through 
membership rolls” is not part of tribal traditional practices.92  
Secondly, even though some early tribal membership rolls may 
have existed by 1885 when the Indian Major Crimes Act was 
enacted, these “rolls” and all enrollment procedures were created 
and maintained by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and not 
Indian tribes.  Courts became aware that for one reason or another, 
BIA officials did not place all Indians living on the reservations on 
official tribal rolls.  In Ex Parte Pero v. Pero for instance,93 after 
examining cases where Indians were judicially determined to be 
Indians even though not present on any tribal membership rolls,94 
the court stated “[T]he refusal of the Department of Interior to 
enroll a certain Indian as a member of a certain tribe is not 
necessarily an administrative determination that the person is not 
an Indian.”95 
Although the decision to include in the universe of “Indian” to 
persons not listed on tribal rolls was initially made out of necessity 
and for pragmatic reasons, today we are in an era where the tribes 
 
 90 United States v. Walter Dale Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (4th Cir. 
1979).   
 91 See Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal 
Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 393–408 
(2015) (describing how and when the concept of “tribal membership” came into 
being).   
 92 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: 
The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1123, 1127 (1994).   
 93 See Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30–33 (7th Cir. 1938).   
 94 See generally Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir. 1917); Sully v. 
United States, 195 F. 113 (C.C.D.S.D. 1912); United States v. Higgins, 103 F. 348, 
348 (C.C.D. Mont. 1900); Doe ex dem. Lafontaine v. Avaline, 8 Ind. 6 (1856).   
 95 Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31.     
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themselves have comprehensively taken over the process of 
maintaining and updating their tribal membership rolls.  The 
question is whether there are any legal or policy reasons to change 
the test and limit the term “Indian” to enrolled tribal members.  As 
one federal magistrate once stated: 
 
As a practical matter, in light of the Indians’ 
protected status under federal law, the 
government’s treaty obligations, and as a matter of 
comity to the tribal courts, and as a rational 
interpretation of the accepted precepts governing 
tribal sovereignty over tribal members and crimes 
committed against tribal members on Indian 
reservations by those acknowledged to be of Indian 
ancestry, the Court concludes that in using the term 
“Indian” in section 1152 Congress intended it to 
mean an Indian who is an enrolled member of a 
federally-recognized tribe.96 
 
Legally, the question is whether constitutional concerns require 
the term “Indian” to be limited to enrolled tribal members.  If the 
answer is no, the next question is whether the purposes and 
policies of the federal criminal statutes, as well as current federal 
policies concerning Indian affairs, would be served by retaining an 
expanded universe of “Indian” beyond formal enrollment in a tribe.  
The constitutional issue will be discussed in Part II, the policy one 
in Part III. 
 
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE 
 
The late Judge Rymer filed a strong dissent in Bruce arguing, 
among other things, that language used by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Antelope,97 should compel lower courts to modify 
Rogers’ second prong because “enrollment-or at a minimum, 
eligibility for enrollment-may be constitutionally required to avoid 
equal protection problems because otherwise, enforcement of 
federal criminal laws would arguably be based on an 
impermissible racial classification.”98 The Court in Antelope had 
 
 96 United States v. Loera, 952 F. Supp. 2d 862, 879 (D. Ariz. 2013).   
 97 United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United 
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)). 
 98 Id. at 1233–34.   
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stated: 
 
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based 
upon impermissible classifications.  Rather, such 
regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians 
as “a separate people” . . .  Federal regulation of 
Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-
sovereign political communities; it is not to be 
viewed as legislation of a “ ‘racial’  group consisting 
of ‘Indians’. . . .” Indeed, respondents were not 
subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because 
they are of the Indian race but because they are 
enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.99 
 
The Bruce majority never answered Judge Rymer’s Equal 
Protection arguments, stating basically that until such time as 
they are modified or overruled by an en banc Ninth Circuit opinion, 
it had to follow circuit precedents which had held that enrollment 
in a federally recognized Indian tribe was not an absolute 
requirement.100  It also has to be noted that in a footnote, the 
Antelope Court acknowledged that “enrollment in an official tribe 
has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal 
jurisdiction, at least where the Indian defendant lived on the 
reservation and ‘maintained tribal relations with the Indians 
thereon.’”101  Because the Indians in the Antelope case were 
enrolled, however, the Court stated that it did not have to intimate 
any view on whether unenrolled Indians could be subject to the 
Major Crimes Act.102 
 
A. The Jurisprudence of Mancari 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Court in Morton v. Mancari upheld 
the constitutionality of a statute granting preference in 
employment to Indians within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.103  
Non-Indian federal employees had argued that the preference 
 
 99 United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). 
 100 Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224–25 (relying on United States v. Walter Dale 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 
758, 761 (9th Cir. 2005)).   
 101 Antelope, 430 U.S. at n.7.   
 102 Id. at n.7. 
 103 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 535 (1974).   
66 ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10 
amounted to racial discrimination and should be reviewed under 
strict scrutiny.104  The Court first mentioned that “resolution of the 
instant issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes 
under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based 
on a history of treaties and the assumption of a ‘guardian–ward’ 
status, to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian 
tribes.”105  After stating that “The plenary power of Congress to 
deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly 
and implicitly from the Constitution. . . .”106 the Court mentioned 
the treaty power and the power to regulate Commerce with the 
Indian tribes as the source of the Government’s power to deal with 
Indian tribes.107  More notably, the Court stated that the Indian 
Commerce power “singles Indians out as a proper subject for 
separate legislation.”108 
After mentioning that if laws specifically addressing the 
concerns of Indians were deemed to be invidious racial 
classification, literally “an entire Title of the United States Code 
would be effectively erased. . . .”109 the Court took the position that 
the preference “does not constitute ‘racial discrimination.’  Indeed 
it is not even ‘racial’ preference,”110 because “[t]he preference, as 
applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, 
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”111  In a 
footnote, the Court emphasized that because the preference only 
applied to tribal members and therefore operated to exclude many 
individuals who were racially Indians but not tribal members, the 
preference was “political rather than racial in nature.”112  The 
Court ended up by concluding that “[a]s long as the special 
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ 
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments 
will not be disturbed.”113  While there are some who thought that 
 
 104 Id. at 537.   
 105 Id. at 551. 
 106 Id. at 551–52. 
 107 Id. at 552. 
 108 Id. (Article I. Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution States 
“The Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).   
 109 Morton, 417 U.S. at 552.   
 110 Id. at 553. 
 111 Id. at 554. 
 112 Id. at n.24. 
 113 Id. at 555. (“Here, where the preference is reasonably and rationally 
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress’ 
classification violates due process.”).      
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the Court may have been announcing a higher level of rational 
basis scrutiny in this sentence,114 this did not turn out to be the 
case.115 
Since Mancari, the Court has evaluated special classification for 
Native Americans four other times and each time upheld the 
classification as not being racial but political.116  The more 
important case for the purpose of this Article is United States v. 
Antelope117 where Indians challenged a law that subjected them to 
a federal criminal law containing a felony murder provision which 
was not applicable to similar crimes committed by non-Indians and 
prosecuted under state law. 
The Court noted that, unlike Mancari, this law was not 
promoting tribal self-government but was “dealing, not with 
matters of self-regulation, but with federal regulation of criminal 
conduct within Indian country.”118  Yet, the Court concluded that 
the law was not based upon impermissible racial classifications 
because Federal regulation of Indian tribes is “rooted in the unique 
status of Indians as ‘separate people’” . . .  it is “governance of once-
sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation 
of a ‘racial’ group consisting of Indians.”119  Absent from the opinion 
was any reference to the trust responsibility or whether the law 
was rationally tied to Congress’s unique obligations towards 
 
 114 See Ralph Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 
WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979).     
 115 See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).  The Court applied 
traditional rational basis review and stated “respondents do not seriously contend 
that application of federal law to Indian tribes is so irrational as to deny equal 
protection.”  Id. at 647, n.8.     
 116 See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).  The Court held that 
a law denying Indians access to state courts did not amount to racial 
discrimination because “[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not 
derive from the race of the plaintiff but from the quasi-sovereign status of the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe.”  Id. at 390.  In the next case, Delaware Tribal 
Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), The Court upheld the 
distribution of a Court of Claims award that had omitted a class of tribal 
descendants.  Finally, in Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima 
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979), The Court upheld against a due process and 
equal protection challenge, a federal law (P.L. 280) which granted criminal 
jurisdiction over some Indian reservations to the state of Washington.  The Court 
stated “It is [well] settled that ‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under 
federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out 
tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive.”  Id. 
at 500–01.   
 117 Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643–44.   
 118 Id. at 646.   
 119 Id. 
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Indians.  Instead, the Court affirmed that laws treating Indians 
differently cannot be considered racial classifications a long as 
they involve the governance of Indian tribes.  In other words, as 
long as the laws are enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce 
clause or to implement and enforce treaties. 
One case, Rice v. Cayetano,120 refused to apply Morton v. 
Mancari’s political  classification, but the challenge was to a state 
law which restricted voting for selection of trustees to the State’s 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs to Native Hawaiians. Even though the 
definition of Native Hawaiian was expanded to include all persons 
who had an ancestor living on the Islands before the arrival of the 
first European in 1778, the Court held that the voting restrictions 
were unconstitutional under the 15th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution because “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race.  It 
is that proxy here.”121  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
distinguished Mancari and mentioned that the reason tribal 
elections established under federal statutes can restrict non-tribal 
members from voting was because these were elections for the 
internal governance of quasi sovereign tribes while this case 
involved elections to a state office.122 
Interestingly enough, four Justices took the position that if the 
statute containing the classification of Native Hawaiians was 
enacted pursuant to a trust responsibility, the classification could 
not be considered racial.  Two of these Justices, Breyer and Souter, 
took the position that there was no federal trust relationship with 
Native Hawaiians and that Native Hawaiians did not “sufficiently 
resemble an Indian tribe.”123 The two other Justices, Stevens and 
Ginsburg, believed that “the grounds for recognizing the existence 
of federal trust power here are overwhelming.”124 
In the lower courts, the debate surrounding when a law with a 
specific “Indian classification” may amount to a racial 
classification has depended on whether the law was enacted 
 
 120 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 542 (2000).    
 121 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, or previous condition of servitude.”); Cayetano, 528 U.S. at 495.   
 122 Cayetano, 528 U.S at 520–21.   
 123 Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., concurring).   
 124 Id. at 532, 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The descendants of the Native 
Hawaiians share with the descendants of the Native Americans  . . .  not only a 
history of subjugation at the hands of colonial forces, but also a purposefully 
created and specialized ‘guardian-ward’ relationship with the United States.”).   
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pursuant to the Indian trust doctrine,125 the Indian Commerce 
clause,126 or affected “uniquely Indian interests.”127  Concerning 
this last one, Judge Kozinski stated: 
 
legislation that relates to Indian land, tribal status, 
self-government, or culture, passes Mancari’s 
rational relation test because ‘such regulation is 
rooted in the unique status of Indians as a “separate 
people” with their own political institutions’ . . . ‘as 
a separate people’, Indians have a right to expect 
some special protection for their land, political 
institutions . . .  and culture.128 
 
As further explained in the next section, this Article takes the 
position that attempting to decide what interests are “uniquely 
Indian” is taking courts into unchartered territory and ultimately 
is not a proper judicial task. 
 
B. Distinguishing Between Racial and Political Classifications 
 
The difficult question in the wake of Mancari has been to 
determine which legislative classifications of Indians are political 
in nature and which ones are racial and therefore subject to strict 
scrutiny.129  In light of these difficulties, some scholars have 
criticized the dichotomy first established in Mancari, and some 
 
 125 Alaska Chapter v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982) (“If the 
preference in fact furthers Congress’s special obligations, then a fortiori it is a 
political rather than racial classification even though racial criteria might be used 
in defining who is an eligible Indian.”).   
 126 See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp. v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 521–22 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (upholding a tribal exception for tribally owned defense contractors).   
The critical consideration is Congress’ power to regulate 
commerce ‘with the Indian Tribes’ . . .  [R]egulation of commerce 
with tribes is at the heart of the Clause, particularly when the 
tribal commerce is with the federal government, as it is here.  
When Congress exercises this constitutional power it 
necessarily must engage in classifications that deal with Indian 
tribes. Id.   
 127 See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).   
 128 Id. at 664 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)).   
 129 See Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting 
Assault on Morton v. Mancari, THE FED. LAW., April 2013, at 48 (commentators 
have noted the many challenges levelled at Mancari’s political v. racial 
classification dichotomy).   
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have even argued for its abandonment. 130  More recently, Professor 
Sarah Krakoff has suggested that although legislation singling out 
Indians and Indian tribes have an “obvious” racial component, this 
does not make such legislation constitutionally suspect on account 
of race. According to Professor Krakoff, the racial component  in 
Indian legislation comes from the fact that Congress under the 
Constitution can only establish government to government 
relationships with groups internal to the United States if the 
members of this group can establish some ancestral ties or lineage 
to indigenous people, meaning people or groups who were in 
existence before the Europeans arrived to America.131 
This Article does not go as far as advocating the abandonment 
of the Mancari dichotomy.  Instead, this Article takes the position 
that  any legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s Indian 
Commerce power cannot be considered “racial”  because Indians 
are singled out for special treatment in that Constitutional 
clause.132 Although some have argued that the 14th Amendment 
was enacted after the Commerce Clause, and as such modified its 
reach,133 others have noted that Section 2 of the 14th Amendment 
does mention “Indians no taxed” as not being eligible to be counted 
for the purpose of apportioning congressional seats.134  These 
scholars have argued that this language showed that the drafters 
of the Amendment did not intend to change previous 
understandings concerning the status of Indians or the political 
status of tribes within the United States.135 
Treating all legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause as not racial legislation does generate  a concern 
 
 130 See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal 
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1059 (2012); Robert Clinton, Isolated in their 
Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-
Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981); Goldberg, supra note 11; Rolnick, supra 
note 7; Berger, supra note 7.     
 131 See Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, 
and the Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 537 (2017).   
 132 This argument has previously been eloquently made by others, see Carole 
Goldberg, American Indians and Preferential Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25  
(2002).       
 133 See David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection: Indians as 
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 759 (1991).   
 134 The first sentence of section 2 of the 14th Amendment reads 
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding the Indians not taxed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.   
 135 See Clinton, supra note 130, at 1012; Carole Goldberg, Not Strictly Racial: 
A Response to “Indians as Peoples”, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 169, 175 (1991).     
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because  the Court has traditionally refused to place any internal 
limit on Congress’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause.136  
In the next section, I describe the limits that should be placed on  
Congress’s Indian Commerce power. 
 
1. Limits on Congressional Power Pursuant to the 
Indian Commerce Clause 
 
The previous generation of pro-tribal scholars were weary of 
congressional plenary power being used to control everything 
inside Indian reservations, thereby infringing unduly on tribal 
sovereignty.137  These scholars argued that there had to be some 
limits to what could be considered “commerce” under the Indian 
Commerce Clause.138  More recently, states rights scholars have 
been leery of Congress using its Indian Commerce Clause power to 
regulate Indian related affairs beyond the reservations thereby 
interfering with state sovereignty.139  Justice Thomas, for instance, 
penned a vigorous concurrence in which he strongly argued that 
Congress had no commerce clause power to enact most sections of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because those provisions 
involved neither trade nor commerce, nor the regulation of Indian 
tribes.140  Concerned that such states’ rights argument may 
endanger some pro-tribal legislation such as ICWA, the next 
generation of pro-tribal scholars have struck a middle ground, 
acknowledging some limits to the power of Congress under the 
 
 136 This does not mean, however, that there are no external limits imposed by 
other parts of the Constitution.  See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987) 
(holding that Congress cannot not take Indian property rights without just 
compensation).   
 137 See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, 
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 213 (1984) (“According to the Court, 
Indian tribes had limited authority over ’internal and social relations’ because 
they were ‘semi-independent.’”); See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of 
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White 
Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 264–65 (1986).   
 138 See Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113, 131 (2002).   
 139 See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian 
Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201 (2007). 
 140 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2570 (2013) (Thomas, 
J., Concurring) (stating “the portions of the ICWA at issue here do not regulate 
Indian tribes as tribes,” since it applied to “all child custody proceedings involving 
an Indian child regardless of whether an Indian tribe is involved.  This case thus 
does not directly implicate Congress’ power to ‘legislate in respect to Indian 
tribes.” (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004))).   
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Indian commerce clause while arguing that the power does extend 
beyond the regulation of “commercial” affairs and may include the 
regulation of all interactions, social or commercial, between the 
tribes or their members, and non-Indians.141 
Although the Court continues to endorse its 1989 statement that 
“the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide 
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian 
affairs,”142 more recent scholarship has demonstrated this 
statement to be historically inaccurate.  Professor Gregory 
Ablavsky, for instance, has argued that the Indian Commerce 
power was “a minor component of a broad Indian affairs power 
resting on multiple [constitutional] provisions.”143  Accepting 
Professor Ablavsky’s findings does not mean that Congress has a 
free hand in treating Indians differently for all purposes.  It is only 
when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, or the 
treaty power, that Congress can classify Indians differently 
without such classifications amounting to racial ones.  Although 
the Indian Commerce Clause power may not give unbridled and 
absolute power to Congress, it is still considerable.144  As I have 
argued elsewhere, for instance, the Trust Doctrine does not limit 
the Indian commerce power to enact Indian legislation just 
benefitting tribes.  Thus, Congress can at times act as a regulator 
(of Indian tribes) and at times as a trustee.145 
How far the Indian Commerce Clause power may extend, 
especially in areas beyond Indian Country, is a difficult question.146  
 
 141 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, in FACING 
THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Wenona F. Singel & Kathryn R. Fort, eds., 2008).   
 142 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).     
 143 Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 
1012, 1050 (2015).   
 144 See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2010) (arguing 
that the Indian Commerce Clause as interpreted by the first Congress in the early 
Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts gave Congress power reaching beyond the 
regulation of trade and commercial affairs with Indian nations).   
 145 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 253, 267–69 (2010).       
 146 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the 
Reservation, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003, 1040–41 (2008).  See also Monica 
Haymond, Who’s in and Who’s out: Congressional Power over Individuals Under 
the Indian Commerce Clause, 102 VA. L. REV. 1589 (2016) (criticizing the new 
regulations (80 Fed. Reg. 10146 (2015)) issued pursuant to the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, and arguing that the power of Congress to 
include as Indians non-enrolled persons living outside Indian Country and having 
no tied to any tribal community is limited and may amount to racial 
classifications).   
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For the purpose of this article, it is clear that it does extend to 
regulation of criminal activities within Indian Country.147  
Although I stated earlier that the Mancari’s Court sentence, to the 
effect that as long as the special treatment of Indians could be tied 
to Congress unique obligations towards Indians, such legislation 
would not be disturbed,148 is better understood as enumerating one 
way a statute concerning Indians can meet rational basis review, 
there is an alternative way to understand that sentence.  I have 
argued elsewhere that cases like Mancari demonstrate that the 
Court has integrated the trust doctrine into the Constitution.149  In 
other words, the Court used the trust doctrine to expand 
Congress’s power over Indian affairs beyond its normal Indian 
Commerce Clause boundaries.  The expansion, however, is not 
infinite.  The legislation has to be rationally tied to Congress’s 
unique trust obligations towards the Tribes.  My argument flowed 
from the language the Court used in Mancari where after first 
stating that “the plenary power of Congress to deal with the special 
problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from 
the Constitution itself,” the Court identified only the Indian 
Commerce power and the various treaties signed with Indian 
nations as the formal sources of this plenary power.150  However, 
the Court quoted from a previous case for the proposition that 
because the United States through wars “overcame the Indians 
and took possession of their lands,” leaving them “helpless and in 
need of protection. . . . Of necessity, the United States assumed the 
duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do 
all that was required to perform that [protection].”151 
One could ask: what if a law, enacted pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause, discriminated more blatantly against Indians, 
such as the laws that used to forbid Indians from possessing liquor 
on Indian reservations?152  I have elsewhere taken the position that 
such law would still not be considered racial classifications 
 
 147 See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646–48 (1977). 
 148 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).   
 149 See Alex T. Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the 
Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247, 247 (2003–04).   
 150 Morton, 417 U.S. at 551–52.     
 151 Id. at 552 (quoting Board of County Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 
715 (1943)).   
 152 For a comprehensive history of the federal alcohol laws related to Indians, 
see Robert J. Miller and Maril Hazlett, The ‘Drunken Indian:’  Myth Distilled into 
Reality Through Federal Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 229 (1996).   
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demanding strict scrutiny.153 Such law, however, should be 
stricken under rational basis review, or a special version of 
rational basis review some have called “rational basis with bite.”154 
This enhanced rational basis review would be available if the 
classification was made out of animus towards the group or if the 
statute was aimed at impairing or denying important liberty 
interests to members of a disfavored group lacking political clout.  
As I explained, the three major differences between the enhanced 
version and regular rational basis review is that under enhanced 
review, courts will: (1) determine the real purpose behind the law, 
(2) look more closely at whether the claimed governmental interest 
is legitimate, and (3) Evaluate the court’s record to determine if 
the means chosen are rationally related to achieving the real 
purpose behind the legislation. 
Because Mancari can be understood as using the trust doctrine 
to either expand the Indian commerce power beyond regular 
“commerce” or uphold the different treatment of Indians under 
rational basis review, in the next section, I discuss what type of 
legislation can in fact be considered as having been enacted 
pursuant to Congress unique obligations towards the Indians. 
 
2. Defining the Extent of Congress’s Unique 
Obligations towards the Indians under the Indian Trust 
Doctrine 
 
One could criticize the reliance on the Indian Trust Doctrine as 
a source of congressional power that is too vague.155  In other 
words, how can one know whether a statute was enacted for the 
benefit of Indians pursuant to Congress’s trust obligations?  One 
of the ambivalences concerning the trust doctrine is that there are 
two versions of it.  According to Professor Mary Wood, the first 
version which she named the “sovereign trust doctrine,”156 
originated with Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia,157 where he described Indian nations as “domestic 
dependent nations” and went on to say that the relationship 
 
 153 See Alex T. Skibine, Using the New Equal Protection to Challenge Federal 
Control over Tribal Lands, 36 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 3, 29 (2015).   
 154 See id. at 50–51 
 155 See id. at 36–37.   
 156 See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native 
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1548 (1994). 
 157 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831).   
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between the United States and these dependent nations resembled 
that of a guardian to its ward.158  Professor Wood has called this 
version the “sovereign trust,” because its main purpose was for the 
trustee, the United States, to protect the continued existence of the 
beneficiaries, the Indian nations, as self-governing sovereign 
entities. 
Unfortunately, the second iteration of the doctrine which 
Professor Wood named the “guardian-ward” version, was not as 
charitable to Indian nations.  It was developed during what is 
referred to as the Allotment Era,159 and its main purpose was to 
grant plenary authority to Congress not only over Indian Affairs 
but also over all the internal affairs of the tribes and their 
members.160  As the Court famously stated in United States v. 
Kagama, “[t]hese Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.  They 
are communities dependent on the United States.  From their very 
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing 
of the Federal Government. . . . there arises the duty of protection, 
and with it the power.”161  One of the many racist overtones of this 
version of the doctrine was that individual Indians were 
considered to be “wards” of the federal government because it was 
thought that they were too incompetent to manage their own 
personal affairs.162  So from a doctrine aimed at preserving Indian 
nations as self-governing entities, the doctrine was transformed as 
a tool to give Congress plenary authority over Indian people so they 
could be more easily assimilated into the dominant society.163 
Eventually, the Allotment Policy was repudiated in the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934,164 the plenary power of Congress over 
Indian tribes is no longer considered absolute power,165 and the 
United States has, since the late 1960’s, adopted a policy of 
 
 158 Id. at 17.   
 159 See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 10 
(1995) (the allotment era took place between 1871 and 1928.  Its main purpose 
was to break up the tribal land base by allotting tribal lands within Indian 
reservations and assign them to individual Indians so that they could become 
farmers and more ready to assimilate with the dominant culture).     
 160 Id. at 9 (in other words, the purpose was to extend the power of Congress 
beyond what was then considered to be the limit of the Indian Commerce power). 
 161 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886).   
 162 For a recent article describing the racist roots of this second version of the 
doctrine, see Mary K. Nagle, Nothing to Trust: The Unconstitutional Origins of 
the Post-Dawes Act Trust Doctrine, 48 TULSA L. REV. 63 (2012).   
 163 See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).   
 164 48 Stat. 984–88 (1934) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. § 461 et. seq.).   
 165 See Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (citing 
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946)).   
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encouraging self-determination for Indian nations166  as 
exemplified by a 2011 Supreme Court case;167 however, the trust 
doctrine today is still very much a mixture of these two earlier 
versions.  As such, it has been criticized by some scholars.168  
Scholars who have favored the continued reliance on the trust 
doctrine have attempted to delimit its contours in an attempt to 
more precisely define Congress’s unique obligations towards the 
Indians.  Reid Chambers, for instance, has argued that the trust 
doctrine should be viewed primarily as a doctrine to protect and 
encourage tribal self-government.169  Professor Mary Wood has 
argued that the purpose of the trust doctrine should be to protect 
the attributes of tribal sovereignty which she claims at a minimum 
include: 1. A stable and separate land base, 2. A viable tribal 
economy, 3. Tribal self-government, and 4. Indian Cultural 
vitality.170 
In a 1980 case the Supreme Court carved some limits on the 
power of Congress to invoke the trust doctrine as a source of 
plenary authority that could be used to get around otherwise 
applicable constitutional limits.  In United States v. Sioux 
Nation,171 The Court held that because the taking of the Black Hills 
from the Sioux Nation in South Dakota by the federal government 
was not made pursuant to the trust responsibility, the Sioux were 
owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.172  The Court 
 
 166 See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 97, 102 (1942) (the 
policy of Indian self-determination started to take shape in the early 1960’s).     
 167 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323–24 (2011) 
(holding that the United States was not analogous to a regular trustee with 
fiduciary duties defined by the common law of trust because the trust function 
performed by the United States for Indian tribes was a sovereign function subject 
to the plenary power of Congress).   
 168 See Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 317, 318 (2006); Stacey Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal 
Autonomy over Lands and Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 441 
(2006).   
 169 Reid P. Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with 
Self-Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal 
Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 1, 
20 (2005).   
 170 See Mary C. Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New 
Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 
UTAH L. REV. 109 (1995); See also Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native 
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1473–74 
(1994).   
 171 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 371 (1980).   
 172 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation”); Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 407–08 (1980). 
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stated “the question whether a particular measure was 
appropriate for protecting and advancing the tribe’s interests, and 
therefore not subject to the constitutional command of the Just 
Compensation Clause, is factual in nature.  The answer must be 
based on a consideration of all the evidence presented.”173 
 
III. WHEN IT COMES TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS AFFECTING 
INDIAN COUNTRY, SHOULD THE TERM “INDIAN” BE LIMITED TO 
PEOPLE OFFICIALLY ENROLLED WITH INDIAN NATIONS? 
 
A. Determining Whether the Definition of Indian for the 
Purpose of Federal Criminal Statutes is a Racial or Political 
Classification 
 
In challenging the classification of “Indian” in the four federal 
statutes at issue here, a defendant would have to allege that he is 
being exposed to different rules than others because of his race or 
the race of his victim and therefore, strict scrutiny should be 
applicable.  Using the test described in Part II, whether treating 
“Indians” differently amounts to a racial classification would 
depend on whether these statutes were enacted pursuant to the 
Indian Commerce clause.  If they were, there are no racial 
classifications involved and rational basis, rather than strict 
scrutiny, applies. 
The first versions of the Indian Country Crimes Act, which came 
into its final form in 1854, were contained in the early Indian 
Trade and Intercourse Acts, the first version of which was enacted 
in 1790.174  Many of the Acts’ criminal provisions were attempts to 
codify provisions contained in treaties signed with the Indian 
nations, dealing with the punishment of interracial crimes 
committed in the Indian Country.175  As such, the ICCA is 
rationally related to the trust responsibility since it is an 
enforcement of the treaty obligations the United States has 
towards the Indian nations.  To the extent the ICCA enforces 
crimes committed between Indian and non-Indians, it deals with 
relations between reservation Indians and outsiders and is, 
therefore, also within the Indian Commerce Clause even if one 
takes the position that such clause does not give Congress the 
 
 173 Id. at 415. 
 174 Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat 137.   
 175 See Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian 
Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 958–62 (1975). 
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power to regulate the internal affairs of the tribes.176 
The Major Crimes Act (MCA) presents more problems because 
the Court originally took the position that it could not have been 
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and used the 
trust doctrine to uphold its legitimacy.177  Today, while the power 
of the Federal government to enact federal criminal laws under the 
interstate Commerce Clause may be successfully challenged,178 its 
power to do so under the Indian Commerce Clause seems, 
unfortunately, beyond doubt.  As the Court stated “If anything, the 
Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power 
from the States to the Federal Government than does the 
Interstate Commerce Clause.”179  Noted scholars have, however, 
challenged the existence of a general federal police power over 
Indian tribes as a matter of original intent or textual analysis of 
the Constitution.180  I agree with their arguments.   Therefore, 
prosecutions undertaken under the Major Crimes Act for a crime 
committed by a tribal member against a member of the same tribe 
may not involve the Indian commerce power.  Under the thesis 
proposed in this article, if sections of the Major Crimes Act are 
beyond the power of Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause, 
the different treatment of Indians under these sections would 
amount to a racial classification and would be evaluated under 
strict scrutiny. While the United States may have many 
compelling interests in implementing such legislation, enforcing 
the trust responsibility should not be considered one of them.   
Many scholars and commentators have argued that the Major 
Crimes Act was not enacted pursuant to the modern version of the 
trust doctrine.181  In other words, it was not done to protect the 
attributes of tribal sovereignty.182  In effect, quite the contrary.  As 
Professor Kevin Washburn once observed: 
  
[T]he Major Crimes Act was a monumental 
 
 176 See supra, notes 131–32.   
 177 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886). 
 178 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).   
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 181 See Troy A. Eid & Carrie Covington Doyle, Separate but Unequal: The 
Federal Criminal Justice System in Indian Country, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067, 
1071 (2010).   
 182 See Wood, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 170, at 1476. 
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encroachment on the sovereign powers of Indian 
tribal governments and a tremendous expansion of 
federal authority over Indian tribes and Indian 
people.  At the time, official federal policy was to 
destroy tribal governments and encourage 
assimilation of individual Indians into the larger 
society.183  
 
Obviously, the MCA is not rationally related to the trust 
obligations that the United States has towards Indian nations. 
There are no similar problems with the Duro Fix or the Indian 
VAWA Amendments, since both statutes reaffirmed the tribes’ 
inherent sovereignty to prosecute non-member Indians and non-
Indians.184  The two statutes are  clearly within the bounds of the 
Indian Commerce Clause as they regulate the relations between 
the tribes and non-members.  In addition, they are consistent with 
the trust doctrine as they were enacted to protect tribal self-
government.  It is noteworthy that the Duro Fix was challenged on 
equal protection grounds in two Circuit Court of Appeals cases.185  
Both cases upheld the Duro Fix against these equal protection 
attacks,186 but since both involved Indians who were bona fide 
members of other federally recognized Indian tribes, they are not 
relevant to the central issue discussed in this Article which is 
whether recognizing as “Indians” persons of Indian ancestry who 
are not members of any federally recognized Indian tribe creates a 
racial classification. 
A Due Process/Equal Protection argument was recently invoked 
on behalf of such a group by Judge Robert Jones in Las Vegas Tribe 
of Paiute Indians v. Phebus.187  At issue in the case was whether 
the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe had jurisdiction, pursuant to the Duro-
fix, to prosecute Phebus after the Tribe had just disenrolled him.  
The tribal court held that Tribal jurisdiction was limited to Indians 
who were enrolled tribal members in a federally recognized tribe.  
Therefore, the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe did not have criminal 
jurisdiction over Phebus since he was no longer enrolled with any 
 
 183 See Washburn, supra note 21, at 783.   
 184 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), 25 U.S.C. 1304 (2012).   
 185 See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005); Morris v. 
Tanner, 160 F. App’x 600, 601–02 (9th Cir, 2005) (affirming Morris v. Tanner, 288 
F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Mont. 2003).   
 186 Means, 432 F.3d at 937; Morris, 160 F. App’x at 601–02.   
 187 Las Vegas Tribe of Pauite Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1231 (D. 
Nev. 2014).       
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Indian tribe.  After the tribal court decision came down, the Tribe 
sued Phebus in Federal Court seeking a declaratory judgment that 
it still had criminal jurisdiction over him because even though 
Phebus was no longer an enrolled tribal member, he could still be 
an “Indian” for the purpose of the Duro Fix since that statute 
adopted the definition of Indian used under the Indian Major 
Crimes Act.188 
The Federal District Court disagreed with both the tribal court 
and the Tribe.  It held that while tribal jurisdiction was not limited 
to enrolled tribal members, this Tribe could only prosecute Phebus 
if, under the second prong of the Bruce test, it could establish that 
Phebus was recognized as an Indian by a tribe other than the one 
that had just disenrolled him.189  The reasoning of the Judge as to 
why he reached that conclusion is far from pellucid.  The Court 
first mentioned that the Supreme Court case which upheld the 
constitutionality of the Duro Fix never reached the merits of the 
Due Process and Equal Protection claim but only held that under 
its plenary power over Indian Affairs, Congress could affirm and 
recognize the inherent power of Indian tribes to prosecute non-
member Indians.190  Secondly, the court interpreted a Ninth 
Circuit precedent, Means v. Navajo Nation,191 to have taken the 
position that tribal prosecutions of non-member Indians under the 
Duro Fix were not in violation of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses as long as the non-member Indian defendant was 
in fact an enrolled or de facto member of another tribe.192  It is true 
that the Means Court saw potentially some serious Equal 
Protection issues with including non-enrolled Indians as Indians 
for the purpose of the Duro Fix.  However, since petitioner Russell 
Means was in fact an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, 
it concluded “We therefore can and do leave for another day the 
challenging question Bruce invites: whether a person who was 
racially Indian, but who was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment 
in any tribe, would be subject to tribal court jurisdiction.”193 
The Phebus court went on to conclude that it had “no problem 
 
 188 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).   
 189 Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1237 (the court also ruled that the issue of whether 
a defendant being tribally prosecuted under the Duro Fix is in fact an Indian 
under the Bruce test should have been submitted to the jury).   
 190 Id. at 1231–32, (discussing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209–10 
(2014)).   
 191 Means, 432 F.3d at 929.   
 192 Id. at 933.   
 193 Id. at 934–35. 
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ruling that equal protection principles prevent a tribe’s 
prosecution of a non-member whose only putative tribal affiliation 
is with the prosecuting tribe itself and where that tribe has in fact 
rejected or revoked the person’s membership.”194  Attempting to 
explain why he had “no problem” with this conclusion, the judge 
just stated “Under such circumstances, the political distinction 
that may be permissibly drawn between non-member Indians and 
non-Indians has been pulled away, leaving behind a purely racial 
distinction between Indians and non-Indians, which is a 
constitutionally impermissible basis for unequal treatment under 
the law.”195 
It is far from clear why a tribal prosecution of a disenrolled 
former member amounts to a racial classification in violation of the 
Equal Protection clause, while a tribal prosecution of another 
person who is not enrolled with any tribe (but was never 
disenrolled by the prosecuting tribe) and otherwise meets the 
Bruce two prong test, should be considered a political 
classification.  It may very well be that the Judge just felt that a 
person who had just been disenrolled by the prosecuting tribe could 
not get a fair trial in that tribal court system.  In other words, the 
holding seems to have more to do with due process and 
fundamental fairness than denial of equal protection based on 
race. 
In conclusion, because it is clear that under the thesis proposed 
in this article, the ICCA, the Duro fix, the Indian VAWA 
Amendments, and unfortunately also the current doctrine, the 
MCA, were all enacted pursuant to  the Indian Commerce power, 
they cannot be considered “racial” classifications under the theory 
presented in this article.  As such, the strict scrutiny test is not 
applicable.  If the classification at issue here, unenrolled persons 
of Indian ancestry, was challenged under the rational basis test, 
that group would have to show the following: First, that it is being 
treated differently than similarly situated individuals.  Secondly, 
that the government does not have a legitimate interest in treating 
the group differently, or that treating the group differently is not 
rationally related to the accomplishment of the government’s 
legitimate goal, purpose, or interest.  Here, the government’s 
interests, whether it is implementing treaty provisions as in the 
ICCA, maintaining law and order on Indian reservations as with 
 
 194 Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1232.   
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the MCA, or protecting tribal sovereignty as with the Duro Fix, are 
all legitimate. 
The only remaining question is whether including as “Indians” 
non-enrolled people of Indian ancestry who have some political or 
social affiliation with a tribe is rationally related to the 
governmental interests of promoting law and order or tribal self-
government on Indian reservations.  Making additional people 
subject to federal or tribal criminal jurisdiction can only bolster 
law and order or tribal sovereignty.  Because the Bruce/Rogers test 
demands significant political or social affiliation with tribal 
communities, there does not appear to be anything arbitrary or 
irrational in including such people of Indian ancestry under the 
definition of “Indian” for the purpose of federal or tribal criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian Country. 
A similar  issue  involving the Equal Protection clause arose in 
a case challenging the power of an executive agency, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA), to deny Native Hawaiians the right to 
petition for federal acknowledgment as an Indian tribe under rules 
established by the agency.196  The Native Hawaiian plaintiffs 
argued that the BIA regulation denying them the right to petition, 
and thereby treating them differently than any other non-
Hawaiian indigenous group within the United States, amounted to 
racial discrimination and should therefore be reviewed under strict 
scrutiny.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.  After distinguishing Rice 
v. Cayetano,197 which had held that a law giving voting preference 
to Native Hawaiians amounted to racial discrimination under the 
15th Amendment to the United States Constitution,198 the Ninth 
Circuit held that refusing to allow native Hawaiian groups the 
right to petition for federal recognition as an Indian tribe did not 
amount to racial discrimination because “the recognition of Indian 
tribes remains a political, rather than racial determination.  
Recognition of political entities, unlike classifications made on the 
basis of race or national origin are not subject to heightened 
scrutiny.”199  Using the lesser standard of judicial review, the court 
held that “the unique history of Hawaii provide sufficient basis to 
sustain the regulation against an equal protection challenge under 
the highly deferential rational basis review.”200 
 
 196 Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 197 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).   
 198 Id. at 542.   
 199 Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004).   
 200 Id. at 1280.   
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It has to be remembered that historically, Congress has been 
given a lot of leeway to determine who qualifies as an Indian and 
what groups qualify as Indian tribes for the purpose of the Indian 
Commerce Clause.  The question was debated at length by the 
Court in United States v. Sandoval.201  The issue in Sandoval was 
whether Congress had the power to enact laws restricting the 
liquor trade inside the lands of the Pueblos in New Mexico.202  
Whether the power existed depended on whether the Pueblos were 
“Indians” and constituted Indian tribes for the purpose of the 
Indian Commerce clause since that is the constitutional clause 
giving Congress the power to enact such laws.  In ruling that it was 
up to Congress to determine whether the Pueblos were Indians and 
constituted Indian tribes, the Court stated: 
 
Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may 
bring a community or body of people within the 
range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an 
Indian tribe, but only in respect of distinctly Indian 
communities the questions whether, to what extent, 
and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt 
with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship 
and protection of the United States are to be 
determined by Congress, and not by the courts.203 
 
For the Sandoval court, determining what groups qualified as 
tribes was intrinsically related to who qualified as an “Indian.”  
Without any “Indian” to speak of, no group could qualify as an 
“Indian” tribe.204  Sandoval came down just a few years after 
Montoya v. United States, where the Court had stated “By a ‘tribe’ 
we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, 
 
 201 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913).   
 202 See Gerald Torres, Who is an Indian? The Story of United States v. 
Sandoval, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 109–45 (Kevin K. Washburn et al. eds., 2011) 
(for a comprehensive analysis of the background and issues presented in the case).   
 203 Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46.   
 204 As insightfully noted by Professor Gerald Torres, the “fundamental error” 
in both the lower court’s opinion in Sandoval as well as in the Supreme Court is 
that the opinions focused wrongly on whether the Pueblo people were racially 
“Indian” instead of focusing on whether the Pueblos were a nation.  Torres, supra 
note 6, at 132.  As stated by Professor Torres, “The racialist thinking that 
percolates through this opinion (and through the Supreme Court’s later opinion 
as well) is that the racial condition of the Pueblos is what determines their legal 
status.”  Id.   
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united in a community under one leadership or government, and 
inhabiting a particular through sometimes ill-defined territory.”205 
 
B. The Policy Perspective: 
 
The previous section has shown that there is very little 
likelihood that expanding the universe of “Indians” beyond formal 
tribal enrollment would be struck as unconstitutional.  The 
question explored in this section is whether there are any policy 
reasons to restrict the definition of Indian to people who are 
enrolled in federally recognized Indian tribes. 
Concerning the definition of “Indian” for the purposes of federal 
jurisdiction, in the first case to come with a multi factor test to 
determine whether someone met the second prong of the Rogers 
test, the court mentioned that: 
 
Congress enacted [these] federal criminal statutes 
in pursuance of the federal trust relationship to 
fulfill three purposes: to prevent lawlessness in 
Indian country, to fill gaps in criminal jurisdiction, 
and to shelter Native Americans from the possible 
biases of local courts.  A broad construction of 
“Indian” to extend federal criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country benefits Native Americans by 
advancing these three goals.206 
 
Yet, as discussed earlier, many pro-tribal scholars do not share 
the opinion that the Indian Major Crimes Act was enacted for the 
benefit of the Indians.207 
It is true that from a law enforcement perspective, as one 
commentator argued, a broad definition of Indian would allow the 
federal government to crack down more efficiently on criminals. 208  
Because of prosecutorial discretion, if a perpetrator can escape 
federal jurisdiction by showing he is not an Indian, states may 
decide not to prosecute him.  As recently stated by the Supreme 
 
 205 Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).   
 206 St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (1988). 
 207 See discussion supra p. 29 & notes 180–183.     
 208 See Brian L. Lewis, Do You Know What You Are? You Are What You Is; You 
Is What You Am; Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction 
and the Current Split in the Courts of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHIC JUST. 
241, 284 (2010).   
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Court “Even when capable of exercising jurisdiction, however, 
States have not devoted their limited criminal justice resources to 
crimes committed in Indian country.”209  On the other hand, from 
a practical perspective, as another commentator noted, the bright 
line approach of only relying on formal membership rolls has its 
advantage.210  First, it would prevent the incongruous situation of 
having federal courts and mostly non-Indian juries decide who is 
an Indian.211  Also, alleged criminal defendants would not be able 
to use their status as Indian or not as a matter of legal strategy to 
dismiss a prosecution.212  Third, it would remove any doubts 
concerning the constitutionality of the classification since the term 
Indian would be limited to tribally enrolled Indians.213  In addition, 
as stated by Judge Ikuta in her Zepeda concurrence, “In holding 
that a person is not an Indian unless a federal court has 
determined that the person has an acceptable Indian ‘blood 
quantum,’ we disrespect the tribe’s sovereignty by refusing to defer 
to the tribe’s own determination of its membership rolls.”214  
Finally, limiting the term to enrolled Indians would get rid of the 
inconsistencies among the various cases, as well as between the 
circuits, 215 and also the inherently unpredictable jury 
determinations on that issue 
From a tribal perspective, it would be difficult to argue for a 
narrow definition of Indians under the MCA and ICCA without a 
corresponding transfer of jurisdiction to the tribes because under 
current law, just diminishing the jurisdiction of the federal 
government without more would not mean a corresponding 
increase in tribal jurisdiction, but an increase in state 
jurisdiction.216  In addition, because the Duro fix and the VAWA 
Amendments adopted the same definition of “Indian” as the Major 
Crimes Act, tribal prosecutors will probably want a broad 
definition of “Indian” for all three statutes.   At least one scholar 
has argued, however, that the definition of “Indian” is flexible 
enough that it could be given a different interpretation for the 
 
 209 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 (2016).   
 210 See Katharine C. Oakley, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 206–07 (2011).   
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 207.   
 213 Id. at 207–08.   
 214 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 2015).   
 215 See Lindsey Trainor Golden, Embracing Tribal Sovereignty to Eliminate 
Criminal Jurisdiction Chaos, 45 U. MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 1039, 1062–63 (2012).   
 216 See discussion supra notes 31–39.   
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purposes of the Duro fix  and the Major Crimes Act, 217 and that 
tribes should be free to come up with their own definition of 
“Indian” for the purposes of the Duro fix. While I agree that giving 
different meanings to the term “Indian” for the purpose of each 
statute would make a lot of sense from a policy perspective, I have 
some doubts that courts would find the actual working of the Duro 
fix flexible enough to allow for that possibility. 218 
In the end, whether Indian tribes should care whether alleged 
criminals of Indian ancestry who are not enrolled tribal members 
are prosecuted by the states instead of by the federal government 
or the tribes is a policy question which should be determined by 
each tribe.  This Article takes the position that federal criminal 
jurisdiction over “Indians” should be limited to enrolled tribal 
members  unless the tribe on whose land the crime was committed 
has come up with precise standards letting federal judges and 
juries know who else qualifies as an Indian for the purposes of 




In summary, this article has argued that, with the possible 
exception of the Indian Major Crimes Act, the classification of 
“Indian” for the purposes of the ICCA and the Duro fix is not 
“racial” even if it includes non-enrolled people of Indian ancestry 
with significant connections to tribal communities.  Furthermore, 
the holding of the Zepeda court, that the first prong of the Rogers 
test could be satisfied by proof of blood quantum from any Indian 
tribe, recognized or not, is highly suspicious, seems to be arbitrary, 
and boosts the argument that the classification of “Indian” in such 
cases is a racial classification.  The conundrum, evident in Zepeda, 
about what type of blood qualifies as Indian blood reinforces the 
argument that the first prong of the Rogers test should be 
eliminated, if not because of constitutional grounds, at least for 
 
 217 See  Addie C. Rolnick, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond Citizenship and 
Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 337, 398 (“It is odd to assume that the limits on 
federal jurisdiction must match the limits on tribal jurisdiction, as the two 
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 218 See, for instance, In Re Gervais, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1224–25 (2004) 
(finding, over tribal objections to the contrary, that the tribe had no criminal 
jurisdiction over the petitioner because he was not an “Indian” for the purposes 
of the Duro-fix).   
 219 See Rolnick, supra note 217, at 398–403 (describing current tribal practices 
and codes defining who is an Indian for purposes of tribal jurisdiction).   
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policy reasons. 
In a report highly critical of law and order on Indian 
reservations, the Indian Law and Order Commission, 
recommended among other things, that: 
 
[A]ny Tribe that so chooses can opt out immediately, 
fully or partially, of Federal Indian country criminal 
jurisdiction and/or congressionally authorized State 
jurisdiction, except for Federal laws of general 
application. Upon a Tribe’s exercise of opting out, 
Congress would immediately recognize the Tribe’s 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over all persons 
within the exterior boundaries of the Tribe’s 
lands . . . 220 
 
The Report in effect argued in favor of a transfer of federal and 
state jurisdiction to the tribes. That conclusion had also been 
endorsed by various scholars and commentators.221  
Acknowledging the problems plaguing current law enforcement on 
Indian reservations, this article  has argued that the universe of 
“Indians” for the purpose of federal jurisdiction should be limited 
to enrolled tribal members unless the relevant tribe has enacted 
precise standards delineating who is an Indian for the purpose of 
federal and tribal jurisdiction on its reservation. 
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